Lac-Megantic: The Biggest Transportation Disaster You’ve Never Heard Of
Posted on May 20, 2015
Filed Under CASE STUDIES, HORROR STORIES
At approximately 1:00am on July 6, 2013, an unattended train loaded with flammable crude oil was parked on a hill near Nantes, Quebec. The train was not properly secured, and it began to roll downhill. At 1:15am, it smashed into the town of Lac-Megantic, Quebec, going approximately 65 mph. It derailed and exploded, ultimately killing 47 people.
What does this have to do with trucks? Nothing, although it does involve trains, trucking’s distant cousin, and I like trains. I do think there are some lessons to be learned, which do apply to trucking. I think it’s a powerful story, of which you have probably never heard, because it happened 20 miles on the other side of the border in Canada.
I’m going to summarize how a train with 63 oil tankers managed to runaway, derail, and explode. Before I get too far, though, below is an audio recording of a phone call between the engineer of the train, Tom Harding, who was supposed to have secured the train so it didn’t run away, and his dispatcher which occurred at 3:29am, about 2 1/4 hours after the train exploded. Harding is in Lac-Megantic at this point, as that’s where his hotel was. He knows the town is on fire, he knows there are oil tank cars burning. He has not, somehow, figured out it is his train which escaped and exploded. Go to 00:55 of the phone call, and hear how someone reacts when informed they just killed 47 people. Beware: the recording contains, not surprisingly, profanity.
The Train
The train was operated by the now bankrupt Montreal, Maine, & Atlantic Railway (MM & A). It originated in North Dakota, and was heading east for the Irving Oil refinery at St. John’s, New Brunswick. It had been operated over a number of railroads, and was now being moved over the MM& A, at the time of the accident.
Here is the route the train took leading up to the accident.
Apparently, on the MM & A, it is standard operating procedure to operate a train with just one employee; the engineer. There is no caboose, there is no conductor, it’s just one guy in the lead engine. That was the case on the night of the accident. Engineer Tom Harding had driven the train from Farnham, Quebec to Nantes, Quebec, where his shift expired. Harding parked the train on a descending grade on the main track about 22:50 on July 5.
Here is a picture of the train, taken on July 5, before the accident.
Once at Nantes, which is about 6 miles west of Lac-Megantic, Harding normally shuts the train down, except for the lead engine, applies the brakes, and then calls a taxi, which takes him down the hill into Lac-Megantic, where he stays at a hotel. Then in the morning, another engineer picks up the train and continues east, while Harding catches a westbound train.
On this night, Harding set the hand brakes on the 5 locomotives, a buffer car, which was a caboose, and the first car, which was a boxcar: seven units in all (five locomotives, one caboose, and one boxcar). He also left the lead engine running, which kept its independent airbrake applied. The lead engine was emitting heavy smoke from its smokestack, however, Harding and his dispatcher decided to let the engine run, expecting the smoke to dissipate as it idled. At around 23:30, Harding got in a taxi, and traveled 6 miles down the hill to his hotel in Lac Megantic.
Just ten minutes later, at 23:40, a 911 call was made to the report a fire on the train. The lead engine had caught on fire.
MM & A sent a track foreman to meet the local fire department. Upon his arrival, the fire department had already shut off the engine, and flipped the electrical breakers to the off position in the cab. At 23:59, the Farnham dispatcher called Harding at his hotel in Lac Megantic, and informed him of the fire. The dispatcher, named RJ, tells Harding the lead engine, which was left running, 5017, caught on fire. He tells him it was shut off. Harding asks if he needs to go back to the train, and start another engine, and the dispatcher tells him, that’s not necessary, and that they’ll start the train back up in the morning. Harding accepts this, hangs up, and goes to bed.
Here is the audio of that phone call, which actually begins at 00:42.
With the engines dead, there was no air compressor running to supply air to the air brake system. Air began to slowly leak from the system, weakening the lead locomotive’s independent brake. About an hour later, around 01:00 on July 6, the braking force of the seven (7) hand brakes and the fading independent brakes proved insufficient to hold the train in place. The train began to roll down the hill. The grade on the track leading into Lac Megantic is around 1%. While that may seem very gentle, given the weight of the train, it was more than enough. By the time the unmanned train hit town, at 01:15, it was moving at 65 miles per hour.
There is a curve in the center of town, with an assigned 15 mph speed limit. The engines managed to get through the curve, and continued down the track. The tank cars however, being top-heavy with flammable crude oil, could not make the curve at 65 mph, and begin flipping over. As they piled into one another, they ruptured, and ignited. Rapidly, the center of town turned into an inferno, burning 47 people to death.
At 01:47, Harding has been rousted out of bed at the hotel by the explosions, and calls his dispatcher “RJ”. Harding informs the dispatcher Lac Megantic is totally on fire at this point. However, he is clueless that it’s his train which ran away and blew up. RJ, the dispatcher, isn’t sure what’s happening either, although I have read that by this point, he had been getting some calls that it was Harding’s train which rolled from Nantes into Lac Megantic. Harding assures him the train is still at Nantes. Of course, it was not. Here is that audio, more profanity:
At 03:29, Harding calls the dispatcher RJ again. At this point, it has become painfully clear to RJ and the rest of the Train Operations Center in Farnham that it was Harding’s MM & A train which got loose and exploded. Harding is still somehow in the dark. RJ tells Harding it is his train which is burning in the center of town. Here is that phone call again:
If you want to read the transcripts of all these phone calls, here is a link to a The Globe and Mail story, where they are all detailed.
Aftermath
The President of MM & A, Ed Burkhardt, almost immediately blamed Harding, stating he did not apply enough handbrakes on the train. After several months, in May, 2014, Canadian authorities arrested the engineer Tom Harding, as well as traffic controller Richard Labrie, and manager of train operations Jean Demaitre, charging them each with 47 counts of criminal negligence. I have tried for figure out if Richard Labrie is the “RJ” from the audio tapes on the night of the crash. I believe it must be, but I don’t know for sure.
TSB Report
In August, 2014, the Canadian TSB, which is their NTSB, released their final report, which I have used as a source for much of this story. It confirmed that Harding did not apply enough handbrakes to hold the train. It also asserted the cause of the engine fire was due to a substandard repair on a cylinder in the engine, which allowed oil to leak and burn. The TSB alleged the MM & A did not take safety seriously. I agree with the TSB.
Analysis
I know a little about railroading. That’s to say, I probably know more than most, but certainly not as much as people who actually work for railroads. I read some pretty good analysis on a railroading forum regarding this accident. It is a standard railroading axiom that you never trust airbrakes alone to secure a train. In other words, you must assume the airbrakes will fail, and there must be enough mechanical handbrakes applied to hold the train. Harding did not apply nearly enough handbrakes. Normally, the airbrakes on the running engine holds the train; no problem. This time, though, the holes in the cheese lined up. The engine broke. It broke while Harding wasn’t there. No one started another engine. Harding was in the habit of not applying enough handbrakes. No one ever trained him, or disciplined him to apply more.
When Harding talked to the dispatcher RJ at midnight, he offered to go back up to the train. The dispatcher RJ told him, don’t worry about it, get his break, take care of it in the morning. The dispatcher probably assumed the train was tied down with enough handbrakes. Harding didn’t figure out at that point, or really at any point, that with lead engine 5017 shut down, only the handbrakes would be holding the train.
There’s an interesting article here, which says once Harding, Labrie, and Demaitre were arrested, they were arraigned in Lac Megantic. Rather than being lynched, the crowd was very quiet; almost sympathetic, largely because they wanted MM & A President Ed Burkhardt, not his three underlings. I’m not totally sure what role Labrie, Demaitre, or even Burkhardt played yet. As for Harding? I know he’s just a regular guy, and by all accounts an experienced engineer. I’m sure he’s been destroyed by the accident. But damn man, you royally screwed up. If it was one of my family members who burned to death? I’m not so sure I’d be so sympathetic.
One thread I see in this accident which carries over to trucking is complacency. Sometimes truck drivers, bus drivers, or in this case, a railroad engineer, forget how dangerous their job can be to themselves and others. In this case, complacency certainly extended up the ladder all the way to the top levels of the MM & A management, who obviously did not take safety seriously enough. I am sure Harding, and probably numerous other MM & A engineers, had parked their oil trains at that exact stop, and had secured the train in that exact way hundreds, if not thousands of times over the years, without incident. This time, though, it all went bad. The bottomline is Harding did not have enough handbrakes applied, and relied on a malfunctioning engine to hold the brakes in place. The brakes failed, and disaster ensued.
This story is mostly told at this point. It’s been almost two years since the accident. The dead have been buried, the town has been mostly rebuilt. The TSB has issued its extensive report on the facts surrounding the case. MM & A went bankrupt.
All that remains is the assignment of blame. Harding and his two MM & A co-workers have been criminally charged with a host of crimes. The Canadian government has elected not to charge anyone else at MM & A with a crime, despite the fact that the TSB discovered a substandard repair on the lead engine is what probably caused it to catch fire in the first place.
Whether Harding and his cohorts are convicted is an open question at this point. While Harding is not 100% responsible for this disaster, he is definitely partially responsible. Whether that will equate to a conviction remains to be seen. Take heed from this disaster story. Sometimes the worse-case scenario does happen.
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Excellent article! This was a horrific catastrophe that should never, ever have occurred. The fact that it got so little press in the U.S. has concerned me. Thank you for your efforts here.
Well, if it happens 30 miles across the border…. out of sight, out of mind. If that crash happens in the U.S., it would be front page news for a month.